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THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT: SHOULD TRADE SECRETS
REMAIN IN THE SUNSHINE?
PATRICIA E. CHAMBERLAIN
MAGINE that your business has been issued a subpoena by the
Florida Attorney General's office compelling your company to
turn over information regarding the marketing of a new product.
There have been complaints about false advertising, and the Attorney
General's office wants to investigate.' You and the other directors
know there is nothing to hide, so a compliance is prepared. Before
giving the information to the Attorney General's office, however, you
ask them to sign a stipulation stating that this information constitutes
a trade secret, and that public access to the material will not be per-
mitted.
Unfortunately, even if the stipulation was signed by a representative
from the attorney general's office, your corporation has a problem-
Florida's Public Records Act. 2 There is currently no blanket exemp-
tion for trade secrets listed in chapter 119,1 therefore, the requested
information becomes a public record open to inspection by any per-
son, for any reason, as soon as it is received by a participating state
agency. Unfair as it may seem, your competitors will now have access
to a wide variety of information generated by your company that they
otherwise would not have been able to obtain.
Based on the apparent inequitable nature of the above scenario, this
Comment will explain why the Public Records Act should be amended
to include an exemption for trade secrets. In doing so, two opposing
public policies will be explored-one favoring disclosure of public re-
cords, and the other favoring the protection of the innovator from
disclosure to the public. The Florida Legislature must weigh these pol-
icies to decide if trade secrets should be granted an exemption from
the Public Records Act. A draft amendment to chapter 119 is included
which addresses the stated concerns. Also included is a discussion of
the Federal Freedom of Information Act and its exemption for trade
secrets. The provisions of this act dictate how the federal government
1. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.206 (1989) (defining powers of enforcing authority to inves-
tigate possible violation of Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act).
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01-.14 (1989).
3. Chapter 119 does speak of a trade secret, but only in relation to software obtained by
an agency under a licensing agreement. See FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(r) (1989).
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is to handle the release of private confidential information through its
public records laws. Finally, an alternative to amending Chapter 119
is discussed: using Florida's recently enacted Uniform Trade Secrets
Act against a state agency to enjoin disclosure of trade secrets.
I. FLORIA'S PUBLIC REcoRDs ACT
The State of Florida consistently has been a leader in the area of
open government and has some of the strongest policies favoring the
disclosure of public records. Enforcement of the Government-in-the-
Sunshine Law4 and the Public Records Act5 continues to play an im-
portant part in the preservation of traditional democratic principles.6
In 1969, the Florida Supreme Court stated:
The right of the public to be present and to be heard during all
phases of enactments by boards and commissions is a source of
strength in our country. During past years tendencies toward secrecy
in public affairs have been the subject of extensive criticism. Terms
such as managed news, secret meetings, closed records, executive
sessions, and study sessions have become synonymous with "hanky
panky" in the minds of public-spirited citizens.'
The Sunshine Laws are designed to promote public faith in govern-
ment based on the belief that if people are aware of the government's
activities they will be more conscientious and informed when voting
and otherwise participating in the political process.8 However, the
Sunshine Laws occasionally have the effect of allowing the revelation
of confidential information belonging to private entities.
To facilitate the policies underlying open government, "public rec-
ord" is given the broad definition of "all documents, papers, letters,
4. The Government-in-the-Sunshine Act requires in part that
[a]ll meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority or of any
agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision,
except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, at which official acts are to be taken
are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times, and no resolution,
rule, or formal action shall be considered binding except as taken or made at such
meeting.
FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1989).
5. The Public Records Act, chapter 119 of the Florida Statutes, states in part that "all
state, county, and municipal records shall at all times be open for a personal inspection by any
person." FLA. STAT. § 119.01(1) (1989).
6. See generally OFmcE OF THE ArroRNEY GENAL, FLoRtMA'S GovERNmrMEr-N-TH-SUN-
smNE AND PuBuc REcoRDs LAW MANUAL (1990) [hereinafter cited as SUNsifIN MANUAL].
7. Board of Public Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969).
8. The right to inspect government records is an important means of ensuring a citizenry
sufficiently informed to participate intelligently in our system of self-government. See Comment,
The Right to Inspect Public Records in Oregon, 53 OR. L. REv. 354 (1974).
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maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings or other
material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or re-
ceived pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transac-
tion of official business by any agency." 9 An "agency" is defined as
"any state, county, district, authority, or municipal officer, depart-
ment, division, board, bureau, commission, or other separate unit of
government created or established by law and any other public or pri-
vate agency, person, partnership, corporation, or business entity act-
ing on behalf of any public agency."' 10
These definitions necessarily include information supplied to a gov-
ernment agency by a private entity, even if the information is identi-
fied as confidential when submitted. "[A] person who sends a
communication to a public officer, relative to the public business,
cannot make his [or her] communication private and confidential sim-
ply by labeling it as such. The law determines its character, not the
will of the sender[.]""
A. History
Florida's public records laws were first enacted in 1909 to codify an
emerging state policy that gave people the right to know what their
government was doing.12 The legislature later enacted a statutory re-
quirement that "all [s]tate, county, and municipal records shall at all
times be open for a personal inspection [by] any citizen of Florida."' 3
In 1967 the public records laws were substantially amended and the
Public Records Act was created. 4
In Wisher v. News-Press Publishing Co.," the Florida Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal recognized judicial authority to grant exemp-
tions from the law based on public policy. The court interpreted the
general exemption provision of the Public Records Act, which re-
ferred to records "deemed by law to be confidential,"'' 6 to mean that
the courts as well as the legislature could determine what should be
9. FLA. STAT. § 119.011(1) (1989).
10. RFA. STAT. § 119.011(2) (1989).
11. 1971 FLA. ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 544, 547 (quoting Egan v. Board of Water Supply,
205 N.Y. 147, 98 N.E. 467, 470 (1912)).
12. Ch. 5492, § 1, 1909 Fla. Laws 132.
13. Id. (current version allows for personal inspection of public records "by any person."
FLA. STAT. § 119.01(1) (1989)).
14. Ch. 67-125, 1967 Fla. Laws 254.
15. 310 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), quashed and remanded, 345 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1977).
The supreme court quashed the decision on narrow grounds, not considering the public access
issue.
16. 310 So. 2d at 347.
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exempt from disclosure. 7 Although the court recognized that no stat-
ute specifically exempted personnel files from public disclosure, it
used the new-found general exemption power to exclude these files
from public disclosure as a matter of public policy.' 8 The court held
that to allow anyone to "rummage through the personnel files of any
employee of state, county, and city government would be to make a
mockery of" the right to privacy. 9 Other states' courts have granted
similar exemptions on public policy grounds. 20
In 1975, responding to an increase in non-statutory exemptions to
the public disclosure requirements, the legislature amended the general
exemption clause, changing the phrase "deemed by law" to read
"provided by law." ' 21 This change in language led the Florida courts
to hold that the legislature intended to restrict judicial exemptions to
the Public Records Act. 22
In Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co. ,23 the Florida Supreme Court
held that no exemptions from public disclosure would be recognized
unless expressly stated by the legislature.24 The issue in Wait was
whether certain common law privileges, such as attorney-client and
work product, were waived by the enactment of the Public Records
Act or were included in the general exemption provision. 25 The district
court of appeal held that the general exemption "clearly waives any
common law privilege of confidentiality which includes attorney-client
communications." 26 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed and de-
clared exempt only "those public records made confidential by statu-
tory law," and held "those documents which are confidential or
privileged only as a result of the judicially created privileges of attor-
ney-client and work product" not exempt. 27 The court refused to
17. Id.
18. Id. Since private employers assume the obligation of treating personnel information on
a confidential basis, government's failure to do so would diminish its ability to compete with the
private sector for qualified job applicants. Therefore, it was in the public interest to deem per-
sonnel files confidential. Id. at 348.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Runyon v. Board of Prison Terms & Paroles, 26 Cal. App. 2d 183, 79 P.2d
101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938).
21. Ch. 75-225, § 4, 1975 Fla. Laws 637, 638 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(a)
(1989)).
22. See State ex rel. Veale v. City of Boca Raton, 353 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
(holding that a court is not free to balance the public's interest in disclosure against the harm
resulting to an individual by reason of such disclosure).
23. 372 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979).
24. Id. at 425.
25. Id. at 422.
26. 353 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
27. 372 So. 2d at 424.
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"equate the acquisition of public documents under [the Public Re-
cords Act] with the rights of discovery afforded a litigant by judi-
cially-created rules of procedure." 28 Consequently, every public record
is subject to examination and inspection provisions unless a specific
statutory provision exempts those records from disclosure. 29
Since Wait, the common law attorney-client privilege has been codi-
fied in the Florida Evidence Code. a0 The Florida Legislature also has
created a limited exemption for such information from the disclosure
requirements of Chapter 119. 31
B. Current Exemptions from the Public Records Act
Section 119.07(3), Florida Statutes, lists the types of records exempt
from public disclosure requirements. In addition to listing twenty-five
specific exemptions3 2 the section provides that "[a]ll public records
which are presently provided by law to be confidential or which are
prohibited from being inspected by the public, whether by general or
special law, are exempt" from the disclosure requirements.33 This gen-
eral exemption allows the legislature to place exemptions throughout
the Florida Statutes. The office of the Attorney General lists a total of
444 exemptions to the Government-in-the-Sunshine Law and the Pub-
lic Records Act, twenty-seven of which pertain to trade secrets and
28. Id. at 425.
29. See also Forsberg v. Housing Auth., 455 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1984); Shevin v. Byron, Har-
less, Schaffer, Reid & Assoc., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
30. FLA. STAT. § 90.506 (1989).
31. This limited exemption reads as follows:
A public record which was prepared by an agency attorney (including an attorney
employed or retained by another public officer or agency to protect or represent the
interests of the agency having custody of the record) or prepared at the attorney's
express direction, which reflects a mental impression, conclusion, litigation strategy,
or legal theory of the attorney or the agency, and which was prepared exclusively for
civil or criminal litigation or for adversarial administrative proceedings, or which was
prepared in anticipation of imminent civil or criminal litigation or imminent adversar-
ial administrative proceedings, is exempt from the provisions of subsection (1) until
the conclusion of the litigation or adversarial administrative proceedings. When as-
serting the right to withhold a public record pursuant to this paragraph, the agency
shall identify the potential parties to any such criminal or civil litigation or adversarial
administrative proceedings. If a court finds that the document or other record has
been improperly withheld under this paragraph, the party seeking access to such docu-
ment or record shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs in addition to
any other remedy ordered by the court.
Ch. 84-298, § 5, 1984 Fla. Laws 1398, 1403 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(o) (1989)).
32. See FLA. STAT. § l19.07(3)(b)-(z) (1989). Under the rules of statutory interpretation,
enumerated exemptions are indicative of the legislative intent to leave all unmentioned items
subject to the law. State ex rel. Veale v. City of Boca Raton, 353 So. 2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1977).
33. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(a) (1989).
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other proprietary business information.3 4 There may be exemptions in-
advertently excluded from these numbers because of the difficulty in
identifying them.35
Under current Florida case law, a determination of exemption from
the Public Records Act is not an exercise of judicial discretion.36 In-
stead, the determination involves only the search for a precise statu-
tory exemption. "If the document contains the information specified
in the exemption provision, it is exempt; if it does not, it is not exempt
and must be made available. ' '3 7 Public policy arguments are no longer
relevant in these cases.
C. Open Government Sunset Review Act of 1984
As the number of exemptions to the Public Records Act increased,
the legislature began to recognize that certain exemptions would even-
tually become obsolete.3" Thus, the Legislature enacted the Open Gov-
34. SuNSHINE MANUAL, supra note 6, at 108-75, 348-50. These exemptions are identified in
sections other than section 119.07(3). For statutes providing exemptions for trade secrets and
other proprietary confidential information, see FLA. STAT. § 24.105(14)(a) (1989); id. §
119.07(3)(r) (1989); id. § 163.01(15)(m) (1989); id. § 230.66(9) (1989); id. § 240.241(2) (1989); id.
§ 240.334(2) (1989); id. § 252.88(1) (1989); id. § 288.075(2) (1989); id. § 341.419 (1989); id. §
350.121 (1989); id. § 364.183 (1989); id. § 366.093 (1989); id. § 367.156 (1989); id. § 377.2408(3)
(1989); id. § 377.606 (1989); id. § 377.701(4) (1989); id. § 378.101(3)(b) (1989); id. §
378.406(l)(a) (1989); id. § 403.111 (1989); id. § 403.73 (1989); id. § 403.771 (1989); id. §
487.041(8) (1989); id. § 502.222 (1989); id. § 570.48(2)(b) (1989); id. § 570.544(8) (1989); id. §
601.76 (1989); id. § 812.081(2) (1989).
35. Since the word "exemption" has no statutory definition, no uniform language was used
when exemptions were created. STAFF OF FLA. S. CoM. ON Gov'T Ops., THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE OPEN GOVERNMENT SUNSET REvEaw ACT (Apr. 1985) [hereinafter cited as IMPLEMENTA-
TION REP.]. It follows that even a computer-based search would not identify all the exemptions.
Id. at 14. For these reasons, estimates of the number of exemptions have varied to a large de-
gree.
36. See, e.g., Rose v. D'Alessandro, 380 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1980); see generally supra notes
13-28 & accompanying text.
37. Florida Soc'y of Newspaper Editors v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 543 So. 2d 1262,
1264 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
38. Specifically, the Speaker of the House, Representative H. Lee Moffit, Dem., Tampa,
1974-1984, spoke of his commitment to open government in his initial address to the House of
Representatives:
Fifteen years ago this state began an unprecedented experiment in open government.
Since that time other states and the federal government have followed Florida's lead.
What a tragedy it would be if we were now to permit that experiment to fail. Florida's
commitment to government in the sunshine has been threatened by the passage of far
too many exceptions, many of them buried in large bills which have escaped the atten-
tion of most legislators. It is estimated that there are now hundreds of exceptions to
the public records law alone. I will be appointing a subcommittee to review all current
exceptions to the public records and government in the sunshine laws and will request
that subcommittee to recommend measures to ensure that exceptions will not be
passed in the future without a visible showing of overriding public necessity.
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ernment Sunset Review Act ("Sunset Review Act"), which mandates
periodic legislative review and provides for the periodic repeal of ex-
emptions to the open government laws.3 9
The Sunset Review Act provides that an exemption should be main-
tained only if it serves an identifiable public purpose. An "identifiable
public purpose" worthy of exemption is defined as one that:
1. Allows the state or its political subdivisions to effectively and
efficiently administer a governmental program, which administration
would be significantly impaired without the exemption, or
2. Protects information of a sensitive personal nature concerning
individuals, the release of which would be defamatory to such
individuals or cause unwarranted damage to the good name or
reputation of such individuals, or would jeopardize the safety of
such individuals, or
3. Protects information of a confidential nature concerning entities;
including but not limited to, a formula, pattern, device, combination
of devices, or compilation of information which is used to protect or
further a business advantage over those who do not know or use it,
and its disclosure would injure the affected entity in the
marketplace.40
The Sunset Review Act eliminates unnecessary or obsolete exemp-
tions. It does not, however, imply that no other exemptions should be
enacted. Rather, it requires that exemptions fall into one of the three
identifiable public purpose categories listed above.
Because almost any proposed exemption could conceivably fit into
one of the broad identifiable public purpose categories listed above,
the Sunset Review Act proposes two other tests that an exemption
must pass to be created or maintained. First, the exemption must "be
significant enough to override the strong public policy of open gov-
ernment. ' ' 4' Second, the exemption must "provide for the maximum
public access to the meetings and records as is consistent with the pur-
pose of the exemption. ' 42 The issues are whether an exemption for
trade secrets serves an identifiable public purpose; and if so, whether
that identifiable public purpose is strong enough to override the coun-
tervailing public purpose of open government. The federal govern-
39. Ch. 84-298, § 8, 1984 Fla. Laws 1398, 1404 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 119.14 (Supp.
1984)). The 1984 Sunset Review Act was amended in 1985 to correct technical and interpretive
flaws. See Ch. 85-301, § 1, 1985 Laws 1879, 1880 (codified at FLA. STAT. 119.14 (1989)). This
Comment will discuss only the 1985 Sunset Review Act.
40. FLA. STAT. § 119.14(4)(b) (1989) (emphasis added).
41. Ch. 85-301, § 1, 1985 Fla. Laws 1879, 1880.
42. FLA. STAT. § 119.14(4)(e) (1989).
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ment and several other states have answered this question in the
affirmative.
II. GOVERNMENT DISSEMINATION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
The problem of government disclosure of confidential information
was discussed by United States Supreme Court Justice William Rehn-
quist in the opening paragraph of Chrysler Corporation v. Brown:
43
The expanding range of federal regulatory activity and growth in
the Government sector of the economy have increased federal
agencies' demands for information about the activities of private
individuals and corporations. These developments have paralleled a
related concern about secrecy in Government and abuse of power.
The Freedom of Information Act [FOIA] . . . was a response to this
concern, but it has also had a largely unforeseen tendency to
exacerbate the uneasiness of those who comply with governmental
demands for information. For under the FOIA third parties have
been able to obtain Government files containing information
submitted by corporations and individuals who thought that the
information would be held in confidence."
A. Federal
The federal counterpart to Florida's Public Records Act is the Free-
dom of Information Act, 45 which requires that each federal agency
disclose to any requesters all records, subject to listed exceptions. 46
The federal courts have universally accepted the proposition that the
FOIA creates a liberal disclosure requirement, limited only by nar-
rowly construed specific exemptions.4 7 As with Florida's Public Re-
cords Act, the identity of the requester and the motivation underlying
the request are irrelevant.4 8 The FOIA also lists certain types of infor-
mation that are exempt from public disclosure requirements.4 9 One of
the listed exemptions is for trade secrets.5 0
43. 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
44. Id. at 285.
45. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
46. See generally Connelly, Secrets and Smokescreens: A Legal and Economic Analysis of
Government Disclosures of Business Data, 1981 Wisc. L. REV. 207.
47. Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
48. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988) provides that agencies "shall make . . . records promptly
available to any person."
49. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1988).
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Because the government regularly interacts with private businesses,
full public disclosure by the government of its own affairs necessarily
results in disclosure of information emanating from private business.
By creating a specific exemption for trade secrets under the FOIA,
Congress in effect has stated a policy against public disclosure by the
government of valuable, private commercial information." This ex-
emption, commonly known as "exemption four," provides that the
FOIA does not apply to matters that are "trade secrets and commer-
cial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential. '5 2 Because a "trade secret" is not defined in the FOIA,
courts have relied on the definition found in the First Restatement of
Torts. 3
Another FOIA exemption relates to matters "specifically exempted
from disclosure by statute" other than the FOIA itself.54 There are
several federal statutes that relate to confidential information that
may qualify as such statutes.5
Despite these exemptions there is evidence that many businesses are
fearful of and frustrated with what they consider excessive govern-
ment disclosure of their proprietary information.5 6 Firms often resist
enforcement of agency subpoenas for information, citing fears that
the agency will disclose the information pursuant to FOIA requests. 7
51. In S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965), it was stated that a trade secret
exemption "[i]s necessary to protect the confidentiality of information which is obtained by the
Government through questionnaires or other inquiries, but which would customarily not be re-
leased to the public by the person from whom it was obtained." See also H.R. REP. No. 89-
1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
52. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1988).
53. The Restatement definition of trade secrets is:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of informa-
tion which is used in one's business, and which gives him [or her] an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it .... It differs from
other secret information in a business ... in that it is not simply information as to
single or ephemeral events in the conduct of a business, as, for example, the amount
or other terms of a secret bid for a contract .... A trade secret is a process or device
for continuous use in the operation of the business.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1988). This is similar to Florida's Public Records Act. See FLA.
STAT. § 119.07(3)(a) (1989).
55. E.g., Census Act § 9, 13 U.S.C. § 9 (1988); Consumer Product Safety Act, § 6, 15
U.S.C. § 2055 (1988); The Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1988); Patent Act § 122, 35
U.S.C. § 122 (1988).
56. Connelly, supra note 46, at 208.
57. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 588 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1978); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555
F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977); Usery v. Whitin Mach. Works, Inc., 554
F.2d 498 (1st Cir. 1977); FTC v. Anderson, 442 F. Supp. 1118 (D.D.C. 1977); SEC v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 404 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1975). Generally the businesses' efforts in these cases
to have the subpoenas quashed or to have the agencies enjoined from releasing the information
have been unsuccessful. Connelly, supra note 46, at 208 n.7.
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Businesses' efforts to protect from disclosure information they submit
to a government agency have become known as "reverse-FOIA"
suits.18
The federal government's initiative to protect private entities from
the unnecessary disclosure of confidential information should send a
message to Florida legislators. Florida should provide equal or greater
protection to this information than the federal government in order to
promote the development of the innovative ideas that are at the heart
of commercial industry.
B. Other States
There are currently forty-eight other states with public records
laws,5 9 twenty-eight of which have exemptions for trade secrets. 60
58. One of the most important reverse-FOIA cases to date was Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281 (1979). In that case, Chrysler, as a party to numerous Government contracts, had submitted
to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) reports and other information about its affirmative ac-
tion programs and the general composition of its work force. The submission of information
had been required by regulations of the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Com-
pliance Programs. Certain third parties made a FOIA request for disclosure of such information
concerning one of Chrysler's plants. DLA proposed to release the requested information, and
Chrysler sued to enjoin the release. The Supreme Court held that there was no private right of
action to enjoin release of information by government agencies under FOIA.
For general discussions of the reverse-FOIA concept, see Clement, The Rights of Submitters
to Prevent Agency Disclosure of Confidential Business Information: The Reverse Freedom of
Information Act Lawsuit, 55 TEX. L. REv. 587 (1977); Note, Reverse FOIA Suits After Chrysler:
A New Direction, 48 FoRi-tm L. REV. 185 (1979).
59. See, e.g., Alabama: ALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (1975 & Supp. 1990); Alaska: ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.25.110 et seq. (1983 & Supp. 1990); Arizona: Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-121 et seq. (1985
& Supp. 1989); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 25-19-105 (1987 & Supp. 1990); California: CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 6250 et seq. (West 1980 & Supp. 1990); Colorado: CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24-72-201
et seq. (1988); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §1-17 (West 1988); Delaware: DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 29, § 10001 et seq. (1983 & Supp. 1988); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-70 et seq.
(1986 & Supp. 1990); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. § 92F-1 et seq. (Supp. 1989); Idaho: IDAHO
CODE § 9-338 et seq. (1990); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 116, para. 43.4 et seq. (Smith-Hurd
1988); Indiana: IND. CODE. ANN. § 5-14-3-1 et seq. (Burns 1987 & Supp. 1990); Iowa: IOWA
CODE ANN. § 22.1 et seq. (West 1989 & Supp. 1990); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-215 et seq.
(1986); Kentucky: Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.870 et seq. (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986 & Supp.
1990); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.1 et seq. (West 1980 & Supp. 1990); Maine: ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 401 et seq. (1989 & Supp. 1989); Maryland: MD. STATE GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 10-612 et seq. (1984 & Supp. 1989); Massachussets: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66, § 1
et seq. (West 1988 & Supp. 1990); Michigan: MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 15.231 et seq. (West
1989 & Supp. 1990); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.03 et seq. (West 1988 & Supp. 1990);
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.010 et seq. (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1990); Montana: MONT.
CODE AN . § 2-6-101 et seq. (1989); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712 (1987); Nevada: NEV.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 239.010 et seq. (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1989); New Hampshire: N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 91-A:1 et seq. (1978 & Supp. 1989); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1 et
seq. (West Supp. 1989); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1 (1978 & Supp. 1990); New
York: N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 84 et seq. (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1990); North Carolina: N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 132-1 et seq. (1986 & Supp. 1989); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18
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These states have acknowledged the need for confidentiality by specif-
(1978 & Supp. 1989); Ohio: Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Anderson 1990); Oklahoma: OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24A.1 et seq. (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. §
192.410 et seq. (1985 & Supp. 1990); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1 et seq. (West
1959 & Supp. 1990); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-1 et seq. (1984 & Supp. 1989); South
Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-3-10 et seq. (Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp. 1989); South Dakota:
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-27-1 et seq. (1985 & Supp. 1990); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. §
10-7-301 et seq. (1987 & Supp. 1990); Texas: TEX. REV. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17-a (Vernon
Supp. 1990); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-26-2 (1987 & Supp. 1990); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 1, § 315 (Supp. 1984); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-340 et seq. (1987 & Supp. 1990);
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.250 et seq. (Supp. 1990); West Virginia: W. VA.
CODE § 29B-1-1 et seq. (1986 & Supp. 1990); Wisconsin: Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 19.31 et seq. (West
1986); Wyoming: Wyo. STAT. § 16-4-201 et seq. (1990).
60. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(9) (1987 & Supp. 1989) ("Files which, if disclosed,
would give advantage to competitors or bidders"); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(k) (West 1980 &
Supp. 1990) ("Records the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to provisions
... of the Evidence Code relating to privilege"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204(3)(a)(IV) (1988)
("Trade secrets, privileged information, and confidential commercial, financial, geological, or
geophysical data furnished by or obtained from any person"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-
19(b)(5) (West 1988) ("trade secrets, which ... are defined as unpatented, secret, commercially
valuable plans, appliances, formulas, or processes"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 1002(d)(2)
(1983) ("Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person which is
of a privileged or confidential nature); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-72(b) (Supp. 1990) ("trade se-
crets obtained from a person or business entity which are of a privileged or confidential nature
and required by law to be submitted to a government agency"); IDAHO CODE § 9-340(2) (1990)
("Trade secrets including those contained in response to public agency requests"); IND. CODE
ANN. § 5-14-3-4(4) (Burns 1987 & Supp. 1990) ("Records containing trade secrets"); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 22.7(3) (West 1989) ("Trade secrets which are recognized and protected as such by
law"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-221(2) (1986) ("Records which are privileged under the rules of
evidence"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44.4(13)(b) (West Supp. 1990) ("Any financial or trade se-
crets . . . of any person, firm, corporation, agency, or other entity"); MD. STATE GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 10-617(d)(1) (1984) ("a trade secret"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.37(b) (West 1988) ("trade
secret information" is defined to be general nonpublic data); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 610.021(15)
(Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1990) ("public records relating to scientific and technological innovations
in which the owner has a proprietary interest"); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-712.05(3) (1987) ("Trade
secrets . . . and other proprietary or commercial information which if released would give ad-
vantage to business competitors and serve no public purpose"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-
A:5(IV) (Supp. 1989) ("Records pertaining to ... confidential, commercial, or financial infor-
mation"); N.Y. Pun. OFF. LAW. § 87(2)(d) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1990) ("trade secrets ...
which if disclosed would cause substantial injury to the competitive position of the subject enter-
prise"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.2 (Supp. 1989) ("any information which ... constitutes a
'trade secret"'); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18.4 (Supp. 1989) ("trade secrets and commercial or
financial information"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24A. 19 (Supp. 1991) ("information related
to research . . . including trade secrets and commercial or financial information"); OR. REV.
STAT. § 192.500(1)(b) (1985 & Supp. 1990) ("trade secrets [which give] its users an opportunity
to obtain a business advantage over competitors who do not know or use it"); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
38-2-2(d)(2) (1984 & Supp. 1989) ("Trade secrets and commercial or financial information ob-
tained from a person, firm, or corporation which is of a privileged or confidential nature");
S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-40(a)(1) (Supp. 1989) ("Trade secrets"); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
6252-17a, § 3(a)(10) (Vernon Supp. 1990) ("trade secrets and commercial or financial informa-
tion"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 317(b)(9) (Supp. 1984) ("trade secrets . . . [which give] its user
or owner an opportunity to obtain business advantage over competitors who do not know or use
it"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.310(1)(aa) (Supp. 1990) ("financial and valuable trade
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ically excluding records containing trade secrets and other confidential
information from public inspection.
C. Florida
Florida's Public Records Act currently does not contain a blanket
exemption for the protection of trade secrets or other confidential in-
formation not connected to criminal intelligence or criminal investiga-
tive information.6' Hence, when a private entity has any civil dealings
with the Attorney General's office requiring the disclosure of confi-
dential information for which there is no statutory exemption, the pri-
vate entity has no assurance that the information will not become
public record.
III. PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS
The common law recognized that the misappropriation of business
information could constitute a species of unfair competition. 62 The
First Restatement of Torts was the first attempt to enunciate the gen-
erally-accepted principles of trade secret law. 63 The comment to sec-
tion 757 noted that "[a] trade secret may consist of any formula,
pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him [or her] an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."6'
The Second Restatement of Torts, published in 1979, did not con-
tain any provisions relating to trade secrets. The American Law Insti-
information"); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-4(l) (1986 & Supp. 1990) ("Trade secrets ... having com-
mercial value, and which give[] [their] users an opportunity to obtain business advantage over
competitors"); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 19.36(5) (West 1986 & Supp. 1989) ("a record containing
information qualifying as a trade secret as defined [by statute]"); Wyo. STAT. § 16-4-203(d)(v)
(1990) ("trade secrets, privileged information and confidential commercial, financial, geological,
or geophysical data furnished by or obtained from any person").
61. Section 119.011(3), Florida Statutes, provides in part:
(a) "Criminal intelligence information" means information with respect to an identifi-
able person or group of persons compiled by a criminal justice agency in an effort to
anticipate, prevent, or monitor possible criminal activity.
(b) "Criminal investigative information" means information with respect to an identi-
fiable person or group of persons collected by a criminal justice agency in the course
of conducting a criminal investigation of a specific act or omission, including, but not
limited to, information derived from laboratory tests, reports of investigators or in-
formants, or any type of surveillance.
The information was exempted from the requirements of the Public Records Act by a 1979
amendment to section 119.07, Florida Statutes. Ch. 79-187, 1979 Fla. Laws 723.
62. See, Comment, The Theft of Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U.
PA. L. R v. 378 (1971).
63. RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
64. Id.
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tute deleted the trade secrets provisions in the belief that this type of
trade regulation had developed into an independent body of law no
longer based upon tort principles. Thus, the American Law Institute
has not discussed the law of trade secrets as it has evolved since the
publication of the First Restatement of Torts. 65 To fill this void the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws66 took
common law principles and incorporated them into a civil cause of
action. This cause of action is codified in the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act ("UTSA"), which protects a trade secret owner from the misap-
propriation of trade secrets. 67
Thirty-two states, including Florida, 68 have adopted the UTSA in an
attempt to bring uniformity to trade secret law. By adopting the
UTSA, states hope to give the judiciary guidance in misappropriation
of information cases. 69
65. See Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 277, 283 (1980).
66. The Uniform Law Commissioners are part of the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws. Since 1892, practicing lawyers, judges, law professors, and govern-
ment officials have worked together for the improvement of state laws. They work to encourage
the free flow of goods, credit and services, full economic growth, and uniformity. Uniform Law
Comm'rs Press Release Pamphlet (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahas-
see, Fla.).
67. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETs ACT wrrn 1985 AENDMENTS, 14 U.L.A. 399 (Supp.
1988) [hereinafter UTSA]. The UTSA was adopted by the National Conference in 1979; five
amendments were incorporated on the recommendation of the American Bar Association's Pat-
ent, Trademark and Copyright Law Section in 1985.
68. Alabama: ALA. CODE §§ 8-27-1 to -6 (Supp. 1990); Alaska: ALAsKA STAT. §§ 45.50.910-
.945 (Supp. 1990); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to -607 (1987); California: CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 3426 to 3426.10 (West Supp. 1990); Colorado: COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 7-74-101 to -110
(1986 & Supp. 1989); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-50 to -58 (West 1987); Dela-
ware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001 to 2009 (1983); Florida: FLA. STAT. §§ 688.001-.009 (1989);
Hawaii: HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 482B-1 to -9 (Supp. 1989); Idaho: IDAHO CODE §§ 48-801 to -807
(Supp. 1990); Illinois: ILL. AN. STAT. ch. 140, paras. 351-359 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); Indi-
ana: IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-2-3-1 to -8 (Bums Supp. 1990); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
60.3320-.3330 (1983); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1431-:1439 (West 1987 & Supp.
1990); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. Am. tit. 10, §§ 1541-1548 (Supp. 1990); Maryland: MD. COM.
LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-1201 to -1209 (1990); Minnesota: Mime. STAT. ANN. §§ 325C.01-.08
(West 1981 & Supp. 1990); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-401 to -409 (1989); Nevada:
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 600A.010-.100 (Supp. 1989); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 350-B:1 to -B:9 (Supp. 1989); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3A-1 to -7 (Supp. 1989);
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-25.1-01 to -08 (Supp. 1989); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 78, §§ 85-94 (1987 & Supp. 1990); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 646.461-.475
(1988); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-41-1 to -11 (Supp. 1989); South Dakota: S.D. CODI-
FEED LAWS ANN. §§ 37-29-1 to -11 (Supp. 1990); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-24-1 to -9 (Supp.
1990); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-336 to -343 (1987 & Supp. 1990); Washington: WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.108.010-.940 (1989); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE. §§ 47-22-1 to -10
(1986); Wisconsin: Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 134.90 (West Supp. 1989); North Carolina enacted a
similar statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to -157 (Supp. 1989).
69. See generally Comment, infra note 70.
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A. Florida's Uniform Trade Secrets Act
Florida adopted the UTSA on October 1, 1988.70 Because the UTSA
does not apply to misappropriation that began or occurred prior to
that date, 7' no Florida case law is yet available to interpret it.
To sustain a cause of action, the UTSA requires that a trade secret
be information, with actual or potential independent economic value
based on its secrecy, that has been reasonably maintained in secret. 72
Under this cause of action, a defendant is liable if (1) the defendant
used improper means to gain access to the information; (2) the defen-
dant used or disclosed a trade secret given to the defendant in a confi-
dential relation; (3) knowing it was a possible trade secret, the
defendant obtained the information from a third party who acquired
it through improper means or the breach of a duty; or (4) the defen-
dant used information obtained by accident or mistake after learning
that it was a trade secret. 73 This prescribed liability implies that a trade
secret disclosed to an outsider in a confidential relationship can be
protected even before any unlawful attempted use or disclosure. 74 By
adopting the UTSA the Florida Legislature acted on behalf of the
identifiable public purpose in favor the protection of trade secrets.
That the legislature provided a cause of action for the misappropria-
tion of trade secrets may lead to the inference that this public purpose
may be strong enough to override the public purpose of open govern-
ment.
The interesting part of the UTSA's definition section is that a "per-
son" is defined to be "a natural person, corporation, business trust,
70. Ch. 88-254, § 1-9, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 688.001-.009 (1989)).
House Bill 91 (1988) was passed on May 17, 1988, by the Florida House of Representatives with
Ill yeas and no nays. FLA. H.R. Joup. 508 (Reg. Sess. May 17, 1988). On June 1, 1988, the
Florida Senate substituted this bill for Senate Bill 233 (1988) and passed it with 35 yeas and no
nays. FLA. S. Joujp. 707-08 (Reg. Sess. June 1, 1988). On July 5, 1988, Governor Bob Martinez
signed House Bill 91 into law. The Florida UTSA includes the 1985 amendments. For an excel-
lent discussion of Florida's Uniform Trade Secrets Act, see Comment, The Uniform Trade Se-
crets Act, 16 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 863 (1988).
71. Ch. 88-254, § 10, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1380.
72. The actual text of the trade secret definition is as follows:
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, pro-
gram, device, method, technique, or process that:
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being gener-
ally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.
FLA. STAT. § 688.002(4) (1989).
73. FLA. STAT. § 688.002(2) (1989).
74. Klitzke, supra note 65, at 302.
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estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, gov-
ernmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial en-
tity. ' '75  The UTSA provides that "[a]ctual or threatened
misappropriation may be enjoined." ' 76 When this provision is used in
conjunction with the UTSA's definition of a "person," it appears to
create a cause of action for a trade secret owner to enjoin a govern-
ment agency that threatens to disclose trade secret information under
the ambit of the Public Records Act.77
Because the federal FOIA does not provide specific definitions or
guidelines for trade secrets, there are uncertainties as to that exemp-
tion's exact scope and meaning. In contrast, Florida will not be
plagued with the FOIA's ambiguous language problems because the
precise definitions of the UTSA would substantially limit the need for
judicial interpretation and discretion. 78
One requirement of a trade secret is that reasonable efforts must
have been taken to maintain the secrecy of that trade secret. One
question for the courts is whether the requirement of "reasonable ef-
forts" allows for turning information over to a state agency, thus
making it a public record. The rights to a trade secret have been found
to be extinguished when a company discloses it to persons not obli-
gated to protect the confidentiality of such information. 79 As a result
of the Public Records Act, it appears a state agency would be "some-
one not obligated to protect the confidentiality" of information sup-
plied by a private entity, for the agency must reveal said information
upon request.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR AN AMENDMENT TO THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT
In the past the legislature has addressed other interests in conflict
with complete public access by amending the Public Records Act. For
example, in Glow v. State ° a defendant in a criminal action demanded
access to "all police reports made in connection with the investigation
of the charges" against him.8 ' The court held that the police reports
were confidential and affirmed the trial court's denial of the request. 82
The court stated:
75. FLA. STAT. § 688.002(3) (1989).
76. Id. § 688.003(1) (1989).
77. Florida has waived its sovereign immunity in other significant instances. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. § 768.28 (1989) (waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 56-61.
79. See, R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[2] (1983).
80. 319 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
81. Id. at 48.
82. Id. at 49.
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If police reports are held to be public records, there would be
nothing to prevent the local representatives of the Mafia from
making weekly visits to the police station in order to stay abreast of
current efforts being made to investigate and thwart crime. Due to
the great public interest in protecting and safeguarding the
confidentiality of the police reports, the trial court [correctly held
them] not open to public inspection.83
The Legislature codified this exemption in its amendment of the Pub-
lic Records Act in 1979 to provide for the exemption of police investi-
gatory records and other such information. 84
Some believe that a blanket exemption to chapter 119 for trade se-
crets would be not be appropriate and that the Legislature should de-
termine exemptions from the Public Records Act on a case-by-case
basis.8 5 It is argued that a blanket exemption would be abused by
practitioners because every request for information by a government
agency would be met by a claim of protected trade secrets. Until re-
cently this was a valid concern. Under the newly enacted UTSA, how-
ever, practitioners and agencies have strict definitions and guidelines
to follow.
Regardless of the applicability of the UTSA, Florida's Public Re-
cords Act should be amended to provide an exemption for trade se-
crets. This exemption should apply only to: 1) trade secrets; and 2)
information that is a) commercial or financial; and b) obtained from a
person, corporation, or other entity; and c) privileged or confidential.
This exemption should state:
All trade secrets and commercial or financial information, as defined
in chapter 688, Florida Statutes, obtained from a person,
corporation, or other entity that is privileged or confidential are
exempt from the provisions of subsection (1). If a court finds that
the document or other record has been improperly withheld under
this paragraph, the party seeking access to such document or record
shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs in addition to
any other remedy ordered by the court.
This exemption is needed because other attempts at establishing it
have not been successful. For example, section 90.506 of the Florida
Evidence Code recognizes a privilege with respect to trade secrets.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Ch. 79-187, 1979 Fla. Laws 723-725 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(d)-(k)(1989)).
85. See Richard & Grosso, A Return to Sunshine: Florida Sunsets Open Government Ex-
emptions, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 705 (1985).
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This section provides that a person or corporation has a privilege to
refuse to disclose trade secrets when the lack of disclosure does not
tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work an injustice.8 6 The issue of a
trade secret privilege arises in the context of litigation when one liti-
gant compels disclosure of the opponent's commercially valuable in-
formation. It may seem logical that the Trade Secrets Privilege would
fall within the scope of Chapter 119's general exemption,17 because
codification in the Florida Statutes should qualify the Trade Secrets
Privilege to be "provided by law to be confidential."
The problem with this theory is the stance that the Florida Supreme
Court has taken in regard to the attorney-client privilege. In Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. City of North Miami,8 8 the Third District
Court of Appeal certified the following question as one of great pub-
lic importance:
Does the lawyer-client privilege section of the Florida Evidence Code
exempt from the disclosure requirements of the Public Records Act
written communications between a lawyer and his public-entity
client?8 9
The Florida Supreme Court answered with a "qualified no" and went
on to state that:
If chapter 90 provided a permanent exemption for attorney/client
communications between government agencies and their attorneys
... it would have been pointless for the legislature to enact [section
119.07(3)(o) of the Florida Statutes] .... As we said in [Neu v.
Miami Herald Publishing Co.], "[i]n construing legislation, courts
should not assume that the legislature acted pointlessly. "9°
The court was referring to an exemption to the Public Records Act
created by the Legislature in 1984 to provide a temporary exemption
86. The text of the trade secret privilege is as follows:
A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent other persons from dis-
closing, a trade secret owned by him [or her] if the allowance of the privilege will not
conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice. When the court directs disclosure, it shall
take the protective measures that the interests of the holder of the privilege, the inter-
ests of the parties, and the furtherance of justice require. The privilege may be claimed
by the person or his [or her] agent or employee.
FLA. STAT. § 90.506 (1989).
87. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(a) (1989).
88. 452 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), approved after remand, 468 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1985).
89. Id. at 219.
90. City of North Miami v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 468 So. 2d 218, 220 (Fla. 1985)
(citing Neu v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 462 So. 2d 821, 825 (Fla. 1985)) (citations omitted).
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from public disclosure of attorney-prepared litigation files for a gov-
ernment agency during the pendency of litigation.91 Since the legisla-
ture found a need for this exemption after the enactment of the
Evidence Code, the court inferred that the legislature did not intend
the Evidence Code to override the disclosure requirements of the Pub-
lic Records Act.92
Another example of a failed attempt to obtain a trade secret exemp-
tion is when a litigant attempts to block the discovery of confidential
material by filing a motion for a protective order under Florida Rule
of Civil Procedure 1.280(c). This rule requires that "a trade secret or
other confidential research, development, or commercial information
not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way." 93 Once
again, however, courts have held that a rule of procedure promul-
gated by the Florida Supreme Court could not constitutionally amend
or modify a statute, 94 and thus Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.280(c) will not exempt trade secrets from disclosure pursuant to
Chapter 119.
The assertion of the trade secret privilege and the motion for a pro-
tective order normally may protect information from disclosure, but
they do not provide such protection in the context of a business entity
dealing with a state agency and the Public Records Act. This is true
for two reasons. First, most of the agency requests for information
come at the investigative stage of proceedings, and because there is no
lawsuit or trial, the rules of procedure will not apply. Second, the
courts of this state, particularly the Florida Supreme Court, have re-
fused to recognize exemptions to the Public Records Act based on ju-
dicially created or recognized privileges, nor are they persuaded by
91. FLA. STAT. § 90.506 (1989).
92. In his dissent, Justice McDonald stated:
Because the Public Records Act exempts records presently provided by law to be
"confidential," and because the Evidence Code provides that documents protected by
an attorney/client privilege are "confidential," I find an additional justification to
conclude that documents subject to an attorney/client privilege are exempt from the
disclosure requirements of the Public Records Act.
468 So. 2d 218, 220 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
93. Rule 1.280 provides in part that:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for
good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may make any order to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue bur-
den or expense that justice requires, including one or more of the following: . . .(7)
that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial infor-
mation not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way ....
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c) (1989).
94. See, e.g., City of Tampa v. Titan Southeast Constr. Corp., 535 F. Supp. 163 (M.D.
Fla. 1982).
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arguments that the Florida Evidence Code creates or codifies such a
privilege. 9
The UTSA may enable a private entity to enjoin a state agency
from disclosing confidential proprietary business information. Unfor-
tunately, there is no case law to guide this analysis. However, if the
UTSA does not override the Public Records Act, it is not useless in
this context, for if the proposed amendment is considered favorably
by the Florida Legislature, the UTSA may still be used to guide practi-
tioners and agencies as they confront the new amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
Florida's Public Records Act was designed to keep the public in-
formed about the government's affairs. In order to promote the effi-
cient operation of state agencies it is important that records and
information pertaining to state activity be open to public scrutiny. On
the other hand, in our technological society innovative ideas are en-
couraged and generously rewarded. As these ideas are of substantial
value to business competitors, the law must respond with protection
from loss. The UTSA possibly has accomplished this. Unfortunately,
the UTSA cannot be used to its fullest effect if there is no relief from
the rigorous requirements of the Public Records Act.
An exemption for trade secrets can be considered an identifiable
public purpose by the Legislature,96 and this identifiable public pur-
pose overrides Florida's strong policy of open government. The
amendment proposed by this Article would promote uniformity, sim-
plicity, and fairness and would not allow the interests of open govern-
ment to destroy the interest of the marketplace competitor.
95. In Wait v. Florida Power & Light, 372 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979), the Florida Supreme
Court had occasion to consider whether the judicially created privileges of work product and
attorney-client extended to public records. The court held that they do not, remarking that if the
common law privileges are to be included as exemptions, it is up to the legislature, and not the
courts, to amend the statute. See also Smith, The Public Records Law and the Sunshine Law:
No Attorney-Client Privilege Per Se, and Limited Attorney Work Product Exemption, 14 STET.
L. REv. 493 (1985).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
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